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 Taxation of Automation and Artificial Intelligence as a Tool of Labour Policy 
By 
Vincent OOI* 
Glendon GOH** 
Abstract 
Rapid developments in automation technology pose a risk of mass 
displacement of human labour, resulting in the need to support and retrain 
displaced workers (a negative externality). We propose an “automation tax” 
that would slow the adoption of automation technology in appropriate 
circumstances, giving workers and social support systems time to adapt. This 
could be easily implemented through changes to the existing schedular system 
of depreciation/ capital allowances, reducing the uncertainty of its application 
and implementation costs. Such a system would be flexible enough to keep 
up with rapid technological developments. Two main dimensions may be 
adjusted to produce intended distortionary effects: 1) accelerated depreciation, 
and 2) bonus depreciation. While the benefits of efficiency gains mean that 
the automation tax is unlikely to have widespread application, it does provide 
a useful tool for specific situations where the rate of automation needs to be 
slowed due to its resultant social costs.  
A. Introduction 
The positive impact of developments in technology on the economy has historically 
outweighed the disruptive impact on employment. However, in the present case, the pace of 
development of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” presents a risk of mass displacement of 
human labour, particularly in tasks that are repetitive and menial. Section B of this article lays 
out the background to these developments and considers their consequences. It goes on to 
submit that that while most workers will be able to continue in their roles after job alteration, 
some workers may be unable to retain their jobs post-automation because they lack all the skills 
required to perform the higher-value redesigned job (structural unemployment).  
Section C of this article moves on to consider the case for an automation tax. It argues 
that automation, by inducing worker displacement, results in social costs arising from the need 
to support and retrain displaced workers, which constitute a negative externality. Thus, an 
“automation tax” is required to correct this market failure. The aims of an automation tax are 
two-pronged: first, to slow the introduction of automation technology in industries which 
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would otherwise suffer rapid and massive unemployment otherwise, so as to provide as much 
time as possible for governments, welfare systems, and workers to prepare for the impending 
effects of structural unemployment; second, to impose a tax on companies that automate so as 
to generate revenue for the support and re-skilling of displaced workers.  
Section D of this article considers the viability of basing this automation tax on existing 
emissions pricing models, eventually rejecting such models after considering the considerable 
differences between them and the requirements of an automation tax (in section E) 
Section F considers how an automation tax could be implemented. It proposes that the 
two main dimensions that may be adjusted to produce intended distortionary effects are: 1) 
accelerated depreciation, and 2) bonus depreciation. Finally, it notes that while the benefits of 
efficiency gains mean that the automation tax is unlikely to have widespread application, it 
does provide a useful tool for specific situations where the rate of automation needs to be 
slowed due to its resultant social costs. 
 
B. Background 
Technological advancement has always had a significant effect on employment and the 
economy.1 The near-simultaneous introduction of clusters of related technologies with broad 
applications – in other words the appearance of a technological wave or revolution – has 
historically been particularly disruptive.2 The recent explosion in progress in a closely-linked 
cluster of areas such as robot dexterity, machine learning, processing power, and sensor 
capabilities appears to herald a new technological wave with profound economic implications. 
Commentators have dubbed this the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”.3  
The central notion of autonomy unites the cluster of technologies that comprise this 
technological revolution. The cost of automation has fallen dramatically, making automation 
more cost-effective for many more industries and companies, while the capabilities of 
automation technology have expanded on multiple fronts, including information collection, 
data processing, and physical action.4 To illustrate the magnitude and implications of these 
improvements, we will briefly explore three examples of the dramatic progress and impact of 
automation technology on the economy. 
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Manufacturing Robots 
Significant progress has been made in the physical capabilities and dexterity of robots, such 
that they are presently able to perform tasks, such as fabric sewing, that could previously only 
be performed by humans. This progress has been enabled by improvements in sensor 
capabilities, which enable robots to have a greater awareness of their environment, 
improvements in processing power, which enable robots to perform the calculations required 
to execute complex tasks, and improvements in machine learning, which enable robots to 
identify the appropriate techniques for executing complex tasks.5 
Artificial Intelligence 
Algorithms have become dramatically better at identifying patterns and making judgments due 
to the greater availability of the data used as raw material for these algorithms, as well as an 
increase in processing power that has made it possible to process and interpret the vast quantity 
of available data.6 Algorithms are used in artificial intelligence programmes, which, due to 
their inherent speed, reliability, and scalability, now possess an advantage over humans in areas 
such as securities trading.7 
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) 
Sensors, processors, and networking capabilities are now sufficiently cheap and sufficiently 
miniaturised to be embedded into everyday objects, creating wide networks of interconnected 
objects that are able to independently collect, process and transmit information.8 
 
C. The Case for an Automation Tax 
Automation and Employment 
Technological waves have historically created significant employment and economic 
opportunities, the positive impact of which has generally outweighed the disruptive impact of 
major technological change. 9  Some positive effects of technological revolutions include 
greater aggregate economic output, a reduction in the need for menial labour, higher labour 
productivity and higher wages, as well as the creation of new job opportunities.10 However, 
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technological revolutions may also result in the mass displacement of human labour rendered 
obsolete by technological advancements.11  
In the short-term, automation is likely to alter existing jobs by catalysing changes in the 
scope and nature of a large proportion of existing occupations. Automation is able to promise 
better results for lower costs in the performance of specific tasks, giving firms a strong 
incentive to automate these tasks and subsequently redesign jobs such that workers 
complement technology by performing other tasks that cannot yet be practicably automated. 
These redesigned jobs will be constituted by a different mix of tasks: for instance, it is 
conceivable that tasks that are repetitive and menial will be replaced by tasks that require 
critical thinking or the management of interpersonal relationships. 
 
Job Displacement as a Negative Externality of Automation 
The negative effects of job alteration are likely to be significant. Some workers may find that 
their skills are no longer relevant due to the full automation of tasks associated with those skills; 
they may thus face structural unemployment. 12  The impact of automation is not evenly 
distributed: business owners may succeed in capturing the gains from automation instead of 
raising employment or wages, and highly-skilled workers that better complement automation 
may benefit more than the low-skilled workers whose jobs are easily automated. 
The Severity of the Problem  
While previous technological revolutions have also resulted in structural and frictional 
unemployment, it is likely that the present wave of automation will be more disruptive than 
before, for several reasons. Firstly, while previous technological innovations did not eliminate 
the need for human labour to operate and control technology, the autonomous nature of the 
present wave of technologies threatens to substitute human labour to a greater extent by fully 
eliminating the need for human intervention in the autonomous execution of a given task.13 
Secondly, unlike previous technological innovations that have been limited in the scope of their 
applicability, autonomous technology, is a general-purpose technology with a much wider set 
of capabilities – ranging from physical action to information processing – and hence the 
potential for disruptive impact across a wider range of sectors.14 Finally, there is less time for 
governments to react to automation due to the rapid rate of progress in automation technology; 
Moore’s Law, for instance, predicts that the computing power of a microchip doubles every 
two years.15 The substitutability, scale, and speed of automation distinguish it from previous 
waves of technological innovation and strengthen the impetus for government intervention.  
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The Pattern of Job Displacement 
Automation technology is currently still maturing. Recent breakthroughs or advancements 
have not all already translated into commercially-viable systems or equipment, and the 
adoption rate for automation technology will differ across firms and industries.16 Hence, the 
impact of automation at any given point in time is unlikely to be significant across the entire 
economy, but is instead likely to be disproportionately large for some sectors or job classes.17 
To illustrate, sectors that are likely to be early adopters of automation include insurance and 
manufacturing, while job classes that are vulnerable to automation include clerical or 
administrative jobs.18  
The concentrated nature of automation’s effects means that worker displacement is 
likely to be limited to a few sectors or job classes at any point in time.19 However, there is a 
strong need for intervention in such sectors as displaced workers are likely to find it more 
difficult to transit to new jobs if most jobs in the same sector or job class are contemporaneously 
vulnerable to automation.20 In other words, there is no need as yet for a radical overhaul of 
corporate or labour policy, but there is a strong need for policy measures targeted at mitigating 
the impact of automation on specific sectors or job classes.  
In some sectors, technological advancements may make it feasible and economically 
compelling for companies to fully automate an entire class of jobs.21 A major problem ensues 
if the workers that perform these jobs are not typically required to possess skills that would 
allow them to perform alternative tasks or jobs. An archetypal example of this is the potential 
effect that self-driving trucks pose to truckers. Unlike other cases of automation like the 
introduction of automated teller machines, which were unable to perform all of the functions 
that human tellers performed, self-driving trucks could fully automate the roles of today’s truck 
drivers. Furthermore, as the main skill of a truck driver is driving, these truckers are unlikely 
to possess skills that would allow them to perform alternative jobs or tasks, unlike bank tellers 
that would have been able to find employment in other customer service roles. Hence, 
automation in cases similar to that of self-driving trucks is likely to result in the long-term 
structural unemployment of a large class of workers. The need for intervention in such sectors 
is therefore particularly acute.  
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An Automation Tax 
The upshot is that automation, by inducing worker displacement, results in social costs arising 
from the need to support and retrain displaced workers. As these costs are borne by the worker 
or by society, instead of being borne by the company that makes the decision to automate, these 
social costs constitute a negative externality.22 The causal relationship between the acts of 
automation performed by firms and the resulting negative externality of job displacement 
creates a prima facie case for the state to intervene by discouraging or penalising these 
externality-generating acts of automation. Such an intervention could take the form of a 
Pigouvian tax,23 which is imposed on an agent responsible for an externality for the purpose of 
mitigating that externality. In this case, such a tax would an automation tax that would apply 
to all the technologies that make up the present wave of technological innovation – imposed 
on companies that automate through the deployment of automated systems or equipment in 
their production process.  
However, the appropriate policy response is not to impose a blanket tax on automation, 
but instead to recognise the distinction between automation’s employment-substituting24 and 
employment-complementing 25  effects, so as to reward instances of the latter while 
disincentivising instances of the former. Such a policy response best exploits the potential of 
automation to raise productivity and generate employment opportunities, while limiting its 
potential for job displacement. 
The aims of an automation tax are two-pronged: first, to slow the introduction of 
automation technology in these industries, so as to provide as much time as possible for 
governments, welfare systems, and workers to prepare for the impending effects of structural 
unemployment; second, to impose a tax on companies that automate so as to generate revenue 
for the support and re-skilling of displaced workers. Regulators must take care to only adopt 
these policy responses in a small number of cases where structural unemployment is 
widespread, irreversible, and clearly attributable to automation. 
 
Reforming the Existing Tax System 
The existing tax system is likely to be ill-suited for dealing with the challenges posed by 
“Fourth Industrial Revolution”. The existing tax systems of most developed nations give 
employers an incentive to make capital investments, but do not give similar incentives for 
employment. 26  This imbalance in incentives arises from the fact that tax deductions on 
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investment in physical assets, such as capital allowances, are granted in many jurisdictions,27 
while payroll taxes are commonly imposed for every human employee. Historically, capital 
allowances and other incentives for investment have encouraged firms to make investments in 
capital that in turn raise the competitiveness and productivity of human labour, resulting in a 
boost to the economy’s productive capacity while providing opportunities for workers. 28 
Moving ahead, however, it is not clear if capital investment will continue to complement 
human labour in this way, as automation displays an increasing potential to substitute and 
displace workers.  
 
Furthermore, while structurally unemployed workers could adapt by reskilling and 
finding opportunities in new industries, the rapid rate at which automation technology is 
improving29 could leave workers with insufficient time to adjust. Given the increasing potential 
and rapid progress of modern technological innovation, tax systems should provide employers 
with an incentive to moderate the pace of displacement while continuing to encourage firms to 
make capital investments in ways that provide opportunities for workers. There is an urgent 
need to reform the tax system to shift from the present blanket incentive for investment, and 
instead move towards encourage labour-complementing investments while discourage labour-
substituting investments.  
 
D. Emissions Pricing as a Model for Automation Taxation 
Theoretical Optimality of Pigouvian Taxation 
We will explore the concept of emissions pricing as a model for automation taxation. Emissions 
pricing, or the imposition of a price on greenhouse gas emissions that is payable by emitters, 
is an example of a Pigouvian tax and has been adopted by several jurisdictions as a response to 
the negative externality of climate change arising from greenhouse gas emissions. 30 
Analogously, a price could be imposed on the deployment of automated systems or equipment 
by firms, as a response to the negative externality of worker displacement caused by such 
automation.  
Such a policy of pricing the externality by imposing a tax constitutes a market-based 
solution to the externality. The intended policy outcome of minimising the size of the 
externality is achieved not by prescribing or proscribing the actions of agents, but by adjusting 
the market prices associated with certain actions in order to fully reflect the externalities of 
these actions. While the intent is to influence agent behaviour by adjusting prices, these agents 
retain the ability to freely choose their actions and to generate the externality under market-
based solutions. These market-based solutions have the advantage of achieving socially-
optimal outcomes through the decentralised choices of independent and incentive-driven 
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agents, eliminating the need for governments to undertake the challenging task of determining 
and dictating what the socially-optimal behaviour would be for each individual agent.31 
 
Implementation Approaches 
Regulators must determine the size of the externality generated by each agent, so as to tax it 
and cancel out the externality. There are two possible ways of doing so. The first approach is 
for regulators to directly estimate the social costs arising from the actions of each individual 
agent.32 It is often difficult to identify or attribute the individual causal contribution of each 
agent to the social costs that are collectively generated.33  
The alternative to directly observing the size of the externality generated is to infer its 
size from observations of the intensity or extent of the agent’s externality-generating actions. 
This is usually achieved in the following way. First, the intensity or extent of the agent’s 
externality-generating actions is quantified and measured in terms of a chosen unit of taxation, 
and then used as a tax base. Next, a specified tax rate is imposed on each unit of the tax base, 
such that the overall tax imposed on each agent is equivalent to the tax rate per unit multiplied 
by the tax base as measured in the same units. This overall tax payable will be a close 
approximation of the size of the externality generated by the agent, and hence will be 
economically optimal, if the tax meets the following conditions. 
First, the agent’s externality-generating actions must be quantified in terms of a single, 
standardised unit that applies to all externality-generating agents. This common unit of 
quantification allows the tax base to be computed for each agent. Second, it must be feasible 
to accurately measure the intensity or extent of the agent’s externality-generating actions in 
terms of the specified unit of taxation. This allows the tax base to be determined for each agent, 
hence enabling the practical enforcement and administration of the tax. Finally, the size of the 
tax base, or the intensity or extent of the agent’s externality-generating actions as measured in 
terms of the specified unit of taxation, must be proportional to the size of the externality. This 
will allow regulators to impose a constant amount of tax for each unit of the externality-
generating action. 
These conditions are met in the case of the EU’s Emissions Trading System (“ETS”),34 
which imposes a tax on each company based on its contribution to climate change, which is 
quantified in terms of the total potential warming effects of the greenhouse gases it emits.  
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The unit of quantification used under the ETS is typically MMTCDE, or million metric 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents.35 The tax base can be measured in terms of these units 
using a three-step procedure: first, the amount in million metric tonnes (“MMT”) of each 
greenhouse gas emitted by an agent is measured; second, to account for differences in the 
environmental effects of different greenhouse gases, the amount in MMT emitted for each 
greenhouse gas is converted into MMTCDE using the associated global-warming potential 
(“GWP”) for that gas; third, the total size of the tax base is obtained by summing the amount 
emitted in MMTCDE across all greenhouse gases. 36  MMTCDEs are a suitable unit of 
quantification, as they provide a single measure of the total effect of the many different types 
of greenhouse gases that could be emitted, and as such can serve as a common unit of 
quantification across companies that emit different types of gases.37 Hence, the first condition 
of a quantifiable tax base is met in the case of the EU ETS.  
The second condition, which is the practicability of measuring the tax base, is also 
fulfilled in the case of the EU ETS. The amount of greenhouse gases emitted by each company 
can be easily and accurately measured by detectors installed on its properties, facilitating the 
computation of the MMTCDE emitted by each company.38  
Finally, the EU ETS meets the condition of having a tax base that is proportional to the 
size of the externality. Since the warming effect for each MMTCDE emitted is a scientifically-
knowable physical fact, the total contribution of a company’s emissions to climate change can 
be obtained simply by multiplying this warming effect by the amount emitted in terms of 
MMTCDEs. Hence, the final condition is fulfilled, as the tax base as measured in terms of 
MMTCDEs is proportional to the externality of climate change generated by each company.  
The ability of the EU ETS to meet the conditions for an efficient Pigouvian tax 
demonstrates its potential to effectively address negative externalities by improving both 
allocative and distributive efficiency. This makes emissions pricing a promising model, at least 
in theory, for tackling the negative externality of job displacement that is associated with 
automation. Through the allocative mechanism, the automation tax could reduce or slow the 
displacement of workers by automation. Through the distributive mechanism, the automation 
tax could generate revenue to support and re-skill workers that are displaced by automation. 
While emissions pricing may be a promising model for an automation tax in theory, an 
automation tax adopted according to the model of emissions pricing would suffer from 
significant practical and theoretical issues. In the following sections, we will explore first the 
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practical design and implementation challenges faced by an automation tax, before exploring 
the theoretical flaws that undermine its economic optimality. 
 
E. Design and Implementation Challenges for an Automation Tax 
Automation taxes could be designed and implemented based on the emissions pricing model. 
Under such a model, the actual or potential employment-displacing effects of automation 
would serve as the base for an automation tax, analogous to emissions pricing systems which 
use the actual or potential warming effects of greenhouse gases as the tax base. Subsequently, 
companies would pay a constant amount of tax for each unit of the tax base.  
The key design and implementation challenge for an automation tax that is based on 
the emissions pricing model is the difficulty in identifying an appropriate tax base. An 
appropriate tax base should meet the three above-mentioned conditions of quantifiability, 
measurability and proportionality: it should be quantifiable in terms of a common unit, it must 
be feasible in practice to measure the size of the tax base in terms of this common unit, and the 
tax base as quantified in terms of this unit should be proportional to the size of the externality. 
If these conditions are not fulfilled, the automation tax may not be practically enforceable. It 
may also fail to be theoretically efficient, as the size of the tax payable by each agent would 
not be proportional to the size of the externality generated by that agent.  
We will explore if the possible tax bases for an automation tax meet all of the above 
three conditions. We will do so by grouping the wide range of possible tax bases into two 
categories. The first category is outcome-related tax bases, under which companies are taxed 
according to the actual outcome, in terms of employment or job displacement, of the 
automation that they have implemented. Tax bases in this first category seek to quantify the 
actual employment-displacing effects of automation.39 The second category is that of action-
related tax bases, under which companies are taxed according to the extent or type of the 
automation that they have implemented – in other words, the intensity of automation. Tax bases 
in this second category seek to quantify the potential employment-displacing effects of 
automation based on the intensity of automation implemented.40 
Overall, we will argue that no tax base in either category meets all three of the 
conditions of quantifiability, measurability, and proportionality. The lack of an appropriate tax 
base from either category poses a significant design and implementation challenge for an 
automation tax based on the emissions pricing model.  
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Outcome-Related Tax Bases 
The most direct approach to determining the size of the externality is to determine the number 
of workers retrenched due to the implementation of automation within a firm. Abbott and 
Bogenschneider argue that this approach is conceptually similar to existing systems where 
employers are taxed, in the form of payments into unemployment insurance schemes, based on 
the number of workers that have been retrenched from their firms.41 Some modifications could 
suffice to transform this existing system into an automation tax. For instance, tax authorities 
could determine the extent to which each firm’s layoffs can be attributed to automation, and 
then accordingly adjust the amount each firm contributes in unemployment insurance payments.  
Tax bases in this outcome-related category could, in theory, meet the three conditions 
of quantifiability, measurability and proportionality. The tax base could be quantified in terms 
of either the number of layoffs, or the total monetary extent of any reduction in worker wages. 
It would also be easily measurable based on the financial data, payrolls, or other internal 
records of companies. If layoffs could be accurately attributed to automation instead of other 
causes, the condition of proportionality would also be met; the size of the tax base, as measured 
in terms of layoffs attributable to automation, would be proportional to the extent of externality 
of automation-induced job displacement.  
The main challenge for outcome-related tax bases lies in the difficulty of determining 
if layoffs should be attributed to automation instead of other possible causes such as poor 
business conditions or productivity improvements unrelated to automation. One potential 
approach for establishing a prima facie causal relationship between automation and layoffs is 
to use a multi-pronged test to determine if the displaced employee was substituted with 
automation. This test could include elements such as whether the period of time between 
automation and the layoff was sufficiently short and whether the tasks automated were 
sufficiently similar to the tasks performed by the displaced employee. The presence of all 
elements in this test could form the basis for a presumption that the layoffs in a given case were 
attributable to automation.  
The interpretation and application of such a test, however, would pose significant 
practical challenges due to the level of technical expertise and industry knowledge required to 
determine, for instance, whether the tasks automated were sufficiently similar to that performed 
by the displaced employee. Given the widespread extent of automation, it is unlikely that tax 
authorities would possess the requisite expert capabilities to an extent sufficient to cope with 
the likely volume of cases. More importantly, the presumptive nature of this approach runs the 
risk of over-estimating the extent of layoffs attributable to automation. Should other layoff-
inducing factors such as a downturn or productivity improvements coincide with the 
implementation of automation, the layoffs caused by these other factors may mistakenly be 
attributed to the impact of automation. This problem may be addressed by removing the 
presumption when other layoff-inducing factors are present, but this opens the possibility for 
firms to disguise the employment-displacing effects of automation by implementing such 
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automation in a manner that coincides with a downturn or with the implementation of other 
productivity improvements. Overall, the approach of using such a test may work well in a 
limited number of situations, such as the replacement of truck drivers with self-driving trucks, 
where the relationship between automation and employee displacement is evident. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, however, where automation bears a more complex 
relationship with employment, this test runs the risk of being either too strict or too lenient.  
An alternative to determining the number of workers retrenched due to automation is 
to use capital, labour or profit ratios as the tax base for the automation tax. This alternative falls 
within the outcome-related category of tax bases because these capital, labour and profit ratios 
are observable outcomes of a firm’s employment and automation decisions, and because these 
ratios could be indicative of the employment-displacing effect of automation implemented 
within a firm. To illustrate, high capital-profit or capital-revenue ratios indicate that a firm uses 
significant amounts of capital, which could come at the expense of employing labour. 
Conversely, low labour-profit or labour-revenue ratios indicate that a firm uses relatively little 
labour to generate sales or profits, which might imply the substitution of capital for labour. To 
determine if a firm has capital ratios that are too high or labour ratios that are too low, tax 
authorities could compare the firm’s present capital or labour ratios either to its own capital or 
labour ratios in previous periods, or to the capital or labour ratios of other firms in the same 
sector.  
Both alternatives have their drawbacks. The former method of comparing a firm’s 
present capital and labour ratios to its own past ratios does not account for inherent differences 
in the capital-intensiveness or profitability of different industries. For instance, automobile 
manufacturing is an inherently more capital-intensive industry than hospitality and tourism, 
while firms in the information technology sector tend to enjoy significantly larger profit 
margins than firms in retail. Consequently, it gives insufficient credit to firms that have 
consistently created more employment opportunities than other companies in the same industry. 
In contrast, the latter method of comparing the firm’s capital and labour ratios to that of its 
peers in the same industry does not account for the way firms have changed over time.  
Overall, it is not clear that outcome-related tax bases, while promising in their attempt 
to directly determine the size of the externality of automation-induced job displacement, can 
overcome the crucial challenge of determining if observed employment outcomes should be 
attributed to automation or to other layoff-inducing factors. Crucially, the relationship between 
observed employment outcomes and automation is too complex and contestable, making it 
difficult for tax authorities to make judgments on attributability that are both sufficiently 
efficient to cope with the high volume of cases and sufficiently accurate to achieve the desired 
economic effects of the automation tax.  
In other words, the condition of proportionality can only be fulfilled, if at all, at the 
expense of the condition of measurability. The upshot is that none of the possible outcome-
related tax bases can meet all three of the conditions for the optimal design of an automation 
tax. 
  
 
Action-Related Tax Bases 
Instead of relying on observable employment outcomes, tax authorities could use the extent or 
type of automation implemented, in other words the overall intensity of automation, as a proxy 
for the employment-displacing impact of automation. For this approach to succeed, the same 
three conditions must be met: what is meant by the “intensity of automation” would have to be 
specified in terms of quantifiable units, it must be feasible to measure the intensity of 
automation in terms of these quantifiable units, and the intensity of automation as measured 
using this quantifiable unit should be proportional to the employment-displacing impact of 
automation, and by extension the size of the externality.  
The first condition is best fulfilled by using the value added by automation as the 
quantifier for the intensity of automation. Since the intensity of automation is intended to reflect 
the extent to which the firm relies on automation, as opposed to labour, to perform value-
generating tasks, it makes sense for the intensity of automation to be quantified in a way that 
captures the total sum of such tasks that are performed by the firm, or the total amount of work 
performed using automation. When summing these tasks, each task should not carry equal 
weight, as tasks vary in terms of their importance to the firm. Instead, the sum should be 
weighted based on the value of each task. This sum of the value of automated tasks is 
conceptually equivalent to the total value added by automation. Furthermore, if it holds true 
that automated tasks could have been performed equally well by human labour, then the value 
added by automation in performing these tasks is indicative of the value of the human labour 
that could have been employed in place of automation, and therefore further indicative of the 
employment-substituting effect of automation.  
Indeed, using the value added by automation as a quantifier is superior to alternative 
means of quantifying the intensity of automation. The cost of automation equipment, for 
instance, is a poor proxy for the intensity of automation. One reason is that the cost of the non-
autonomous components of automation equipment may contribute disproportionately to the 
overall cost of the equipment. For instance, a self-driving vehicle may only be slightly more 
expensive than a comparable conventional vehicle, because the cost of its autonomous 
components and software makes up only a fraction of the car’s total cost. In this case, it seems 
inappropriate that the entire cost of the car should be taxable. Even if the tax base included 
only the cost of the automation-related components of equipment, this cost is a poor reflection 
of the extent to which tasks have been automated by this piece of equipment. Expensive 
equipment may not necessarily have greater capabilities or contribute to the automation of more 
tasks; indeed, while physical capital tends to have a constant and significant cost per marginal 
unit of output, the scalability and low marginal cost of automation technologies such as 
algorithms means that the impact of these technologies is decoupled from their cost.42 The 
upshot is that automation taxes ought not to take a form similar to that of a sales tax, since that 
would entail using the cost of automation as a tax base.  
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Another alternative way to quantify the intensity of automation is to determine the 
potential capabilities of automation systems and equipment purchased by a firm. Should a firm 
invest in automation systems and equipment that have significant capabilities or that are able 
to perform a significant proportion of the tasks involved in the production process, it is 
reasonable to assume that they are automating to an intensive degree. To facilitate comparisons 
between systems and equipment with different capabilities, technical experts could estimate 
the amount of human labour that could be replaced by automation systems or equipment with 
a particular feature or a particular category of automation system or equipment. The tax base 
could then be computed by adding up the estimated quantity of human labour that could be 
replaced by each individual system or piece of equipment, so as to obtain the total amount of 
human labour that could be replaced by the potential capabilities of the entirety of a firm’s 
automation systems or equipment. However, this capability-based approach of quantifying the 
intensity of automation suffers from a problem similar to that of the cost-based approach 
discussed above. Automation systems and equipment with greater capabilities have greater 
potential for performing tasks, but the actual scale of the tasks performed by automation may 
not be as significant as the full potential of such automation. Again, the impact of automation 
depends not only on the intrinsic capabilities of the equipment or systems used, but also on the 
size of demand for the goods and services that are produced through automation. In the context 
of automation, the capabilities of equipment or systems give a sense of what types of tasks they 
can perform, but may not necessarily shed light on the scale or significance of these tasks. The 
value added by automation remains superior to alternatives, such as the cost or capabilities of 
automation systems and equipment, for quantifying the intensity of automation.  
Having shown that the value added by automation is the best available means of 
quantifying the intensity of automation, we will now examine if the value added by automation 
is easily measurable and observable. Here, we run into a problem similar to that faced by 
outcome-related tax bases: the problem of attributing outcomes, such as employment outcomes 
in the previous case or value added in this case, to automation as opposed to other factors that 
might also be causally related to these outcomes. While it is possible to determine the change 
in the profitability or output of a firm following an instance of automation, it is incorrect to 
assume that this change in value added is entirely attributable to automation. Any observed 
change might have been caused, for instance, by process changes that were unrelated to and 
introduced at the same time as the implementation of automation. Furthermore, the value added 
by automation depends significantly on the synergies between automation and other inputs or 
changes such as capital, skilled labour or improvements to business processes. The presence of 
these synergies precludes a neat decomposition or partition of the total output of a firm into the 
separate contributions or value added by individual inputs such as automation and labour. The 
upshot is that the value added by automation is in practice difficult to measure or determine.  
The value added by automation fails not only the second condition of being measurable 
but also the third condition of being strongly correlated with the employment-displacing effects 
of such automation. The key assumption that is required for this final condition to be fulfilled 
is that the value added by automation could have been value added by labour. This assumption 
does not hold in all instances of automation. For example, the value created by Internet search 
  
engine algorithms is value added by automation that could not have been achieved with the use 
of human labour alone, due to the unfeasibility of making humans search manually through 
millions of webpages. Similarly, the value added by automated precision manufacturing tools 
lies in the ability to achieve a level of accuracy and reliability that would be impossible with 
human labour. Including these instances of value added by automation in the tax base for an 
automation tax has two implications: first, the desired outcome of ameliorating worker 
displacement is not achieved, as human labour cannot be used as a substitute for automation in 
these cases; second, as these forms of automation provide benefits to society that could not 
otherwise be achieved, there is an economic loss to society as the use or development of such 
automation is penalised.  
To summarise the discussion above, the intensity of automation meets only one of the 
three conditions that are necessary for it to serve as an appropriate tax base for an automation 
tax. While it can be quantified in terms of the value added by automation, this value added 
cannot easily be measured and does not correlate well with the size of the externality, making 
it a poor tax base both in terms of practical enforcement as well as in terms of theoretical 
efficiency.  
 
Theoretical Challenges 
An automation tax, unlike an emissions pricing regime, may not be theoretically optimal due 
to the adverse social and economic impacts of such a tax. These adverse impacts are especially 
significant in open economies that are highly exposed to global competition in technology, 
trade and investment.  
The Cost to Technological Competitiveness 
The first of these adverse impacts is that an automation tax threatens to undermine the 
economy’s technological competitiveness. The rapid growth and potential size of the 
technology sector has resulted in intense global competition for leadership in the development 
and production of various automation-related technologies, such as artificial intelligence and 
robotics.43 The importance of rapidly assuming leadership in automation development and 
production is magnified by two facts: first, technological dominance can translate into broader 
economic dominance, as automation-related goods and solutions are likely to be widely 
embedded in the production and consumption of goods and services across all sectors;44 second, 
players that assume early leadership in the automation sector have the opportunity to entrench 
their dominant positions with their outsize influence over the development of global technology 
standards.45 
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An automation tax could undermine an economy’s efforts at assuming this leadership 
position and strengthening its technology sector in two ways. Firstly, the technology sector is 
likely to be disproportionately affected by an automation tax, due to the high degree of 
automation technology used in the development and production of automation technology itself. 
Secondly, even if the technology sector is exempted from an automation tax, such an 
automation tax would result in the loss of industrial users of automation technology and the 
loss of labour with automation-related skills in other sectors of the economy. As a critical mass 
of both skilled talent and industrial partners is crucial for nurturing a budding automation 
production and development industry, an automation tax that obstructs the formation of this 
critical mass also poses an obstacle to the development of the economy’s technology sector.  
Beyond the longer-term effect on the growth and development of technology sector, 
however, there are more immediate costs to the wider economy. Firstly, the allocative effect of 
an automation tax will undermine the economy’s trade competitiveness in non-technology 
sectors. By raising the productivity of the production process and reducing labour costs, 
automation contributes to a reduced cost of production for goods of similar type and quality, 
making these goods more competitive in global markets. If companies were to reduce their use 
of automation due to the allocative effects an automation tax, the economy would forgo the 
export-boosting benefits of automation. These benefits are particularly large for the developed 
economies that are the focus of this article: their greater ability to adopt automation technology 
allows them to compensate for their higher labour costs by raising labour productivity and 
reducing production costs, allowing them to retain trade competitiveness and by extension 
employment opportunities in automation-intensive sectors.46  
Secondly, the distributive effect of an automation tax will undermine the economy’s 
competitiveness for investment and production in non-technology sectors. As globalisation has 
made it possible for large multi-national corporations (“MNCs”) to shift production and 
investment to economies with the lowest costs and greatest returns, competition among 
economies for the limited global pie of investment and production is intensifying.47 If the 
potential returns of MNCs investing in a given economy were to be reduced due to the 
distributive effects of an automation tax, its competitors would become relatively more 
attractive as destinations for investment and production. All things equal, this would shrink the 
economic output of as well as the medium-term supply of employment opportunities available 
within that economy.  
These adverse impacts on the output of and supply of job opportunities in non-
technology sectors are likely to be particularly acute in automation-intensive sectors – sectors 
in which the use of automation contributes significantly to output and productivity, and in 
which companies are likely to make investment and production decisions based on an 
economy’s openness to the use of automation. The adverse economic impact of an automation 
tax is likely to be magnified by the importance of these automation-intensive sectors to 
developed economies as these are likely to be sectors that are high-value and highly productive, 
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in addition to being the sectors in which developed economies are likely to have a comparative 
advantage.  
More significantly, this fact that the negative effects of an automation tax are likely to 
be concentrated in automation-intensive sectors implies that an automation tax could be highly 
counterproductive. The intent of an automation tax, after all, is to mitigate the effect of 
automation in displacing workers, especially in automation-intensive industries. While such an 
automation may serve as a direct remedy by slowing the pace of automation or by raising funds 
to support affected workers, it may also indirectly exacerbate the underlying problem by 
undermining the price competitiveness of their output and the creation of job opportunities in 
their sectors. In other words, automation is a double-edged sword for workers in automation-
intensive industries: it threatens to displace their labour but compensates by safeguarding them 
from external competition for their output and their jobs. Automation can be both employment-
substituting and employment-complementing; in attempting to address the costs of the former, 
an automation tax may force society to forego the sizeable benefits of the latter.  
 
Differences Between the Cases of Automation and Emissions 
There are two crucial differences between the economic benefits of automation and those of 
greenhouse gas emissions. The first difference lies in the parties to which these benefits accrue. 
Since the economic benefits of greenhouse gas emissions are fully captured by private agents, 
the imposition of a Pigouvian tax achieves a socially optimal outcome by compelling these 
agents to consider the social costs of emissions in addition to their private benefits. In contrast, 
the economic benefits of automation extend beyond the agent to society in general, and hence 
are not considered by agents in making decisions on whether to automate. This results in a 
suboptimal degree of automation in society – a problem exacerbated by an automation tax. The 
second difference is that an automation tax, unlike an emissions pricing scheme, has the 
potential to be counterproductive because the employment-substituting effects of automation 
are directly opposed to its employment-complementing effects. In other words, while it is 
certain that an emissions pricing scheme will at least to some extent accomplish its objective 
of mitigating climate change, it is unclear if the net effect of an automation tax will be to 
decrease or increase employment in automation-intensive industries.  
Hence, unlike emissions pricing schemes that are theoretically effective as a means of 
tackling climate change, an automation tax could suffer from serious theoretical flaws. An 
automation tax adopted according to the emissions pricing model assumes that automation will 
inevitably result in the displacement of employment, and therefore generate an externality that 
must be remedied through a Pigouvian tax. As our discussion above shows, however, 
automation is not purely a substitute for labour. Like other forms of capital or other productivity 
improvements, it may have employment-complementing or employment-substituting effects. 
This is unlike the case of greenhouse gases, which have an unambiguously negative effect on 
the environment. 
 
  
F. Proposal: Reverse Depreciation 
We propose that any reforms to the corporate tax system be made to the existing system of 
depreciation/ capital allowances. Instead of a blanket deduction for capital investment, we 
suggest that the deductibility of capital investments should vary depending on the effect of the 
capital investment on employment. More specifically, companies that invest heavily in 
employment-complementing capital will be allowed to deduct a greater proportion of their 
capital expenditure from their taxable income, while companies that invest more heavily in 
employment-substituting capital will only be allowed to deduct a smaller proportion of their 
capital expenditure. We have chosen this approach for several reasons.  
This reform directly tackles the need to rebalance existing capital investment incentives 
for companies. The existing capital allowances system gives companies a blanket incentive to 
invest in capital, regardless of whether this capital is employment-substituting or employment-
complementing. While such a blanket deduction may have been appropriate in a context where 
new and better employment opportunities were continuously being generated, it is no longer 
appropriate in the present context where the rate of automation-induced job displacement is 
likely to exceed the rate at which new job opportunities are created. By targeting capital 
allowances, this reform ensures that  
This reform further tackles the need to expand the revenue base so that the government 
has sufficient funds to support the growing number of displaced workers. By reducing the 
deductibility of capital expenditure for a subset of companies, the government can raise more 
corporate tax revenue without an increase in the headline rates of existing taxes.  
Overall, reforming the existing system of capital allowances corrects the imbalances of 
the existing system and also expands the revenue base to address the increased need for 
government support of displaced workers. We will now suggest several reasons for why 
targeting capital allowances is superior to alternative means of achieving these two goals of 
rebalancing incentives and raising revenue. 
First, as the additional revenue raised by our proposed reform is generated by reducing 
the tax deductibility of some capital investments, the additional tax burden is imposed only on 
profit-making companies. In contrast, alternatives such as an automation tax or a tax on the 
capital-profit ratio impose an additional tax burden on both profit-making and loss-making 
companies. The effect of the latter is to increase the pressure on struggling companies and make 
it more difficult for them to invest in automation as a means of staying afloat. While this may 
achieve the intended effect of reducing overall levels of investment into employment-
substituting capital, it has the unintended and more significant effect of reducing the 
competitiveness of local firms vis-à-vis their international competitors. In turn, this may result 
in greater job losses as uncompetitive domestic firms are forced to shut down or relocate in the 
face of external competition. This problem can be avoided by ensuring that only profit-making 
firms – firms that are able to generate profits even in the face of competition – are subject to 
the increased tax burden. Revising the existing system of capital allowances accomplishes this 
goal.  
  
Second, the enforceability of this proposal is superior to that of imposing a completely 
new tax. While companies can avoid a direct tax on automation by concealing their investments 
into automation, there is no similar means of avoidance for a policy that removes the tax 
deductibility of some capital investments. Furthermore, there is already a well-established 
enforcement and administrative mechanism for the existing system of capital allowances, as 
well as a significant body of case law. Piggybacking on this solid foundation avoids the 
inefficiency and disruption that would result from the establishment of an entirely new 
enforcement and administrative mechanism for a new tax.  
Finally, this proposal contributes to increasing the overall productivity of the economy, 
which is necessary to allow domestic industries to face the threat of external and low-cost 
competition. It continues to preserve the deductibility of capital expenditure if such expenditure 
complements labour, so companies continue to have an incentive to raise worker productivity 
by investing in capital. Furthermore, unlike a blanket excise tax on technology or capital or a 
tax on companies with high capital-profit ratios, it does not distort the market by placing a 
greater tax burden on companies in capital-intensive industries. Instead, companies in these 
industries can continue to enjoy the existing tax benefits of capital investment, so long as they 
ensure that their capital investments are enhance but do not displace existing job opportunities.  
Our proposal of making adjustments to the deductibility of capital expenditure in order 
to achieve a policy objective – in this case the attenuation of the effects of automation on 
employment – is not without precedent. Depreciation rates have been accelerated to stimulate 
investment during recessions,48 and bonus capital allowances were granted to companies in the 
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 enacted by the US Congress in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks.49 These precedents suggest that it is feasible and legally justifiable 
to use capital allowances as a policy instrument to achieve economic goals.  
 
A Complex Problem 
The function of the automation tax is as a policy tool for the Government to control the rate at 
which automation displaces human workers. Given that automation is doing so in a myriad of 
different ways and in unpredictable and perhaps unimaginable ways, the ideal robot tax would 
have to be complex enough to apply in all these different ways, and flexible enough to keep up 
with the rapid developments in automation technology. The demand for a system that works in 
precisely such a way is not new. Tax authorities around the world have long realized the 
inadequacies of general tax rules;50 draft them too broadly and there is no taxpayer certainty; 
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draft them too narrowly and risk the loss of tax revenue.51 The solution lay in the use of 
comprehensive schedules supported by general tax principles; each item on the schedule could 
be accorded different tax treatment depending on the governmental policy at the time.52 Such 
a system was applied to the tax treatment of assets acquired for use in businesses. The use of 
such systems diverged over time, with the United States labelling the concept “depreciation of 
assets” and the United Kingdom calling it “capital allowances”. This section explores the 
mechanism of “depreciation”, which has been used to provide tax incentives and disincentives 
arguably since 1878. 53  It will argue that the schedular system used by depreciation is 
extraordinarily well suited for controlling the rate at which automation displaces human 
workers.  
 
The Concept of Depreciation 
The fundamental concept of depreciation is simple enough to grasp. A firm which invests in 
new capital for its business incurs an expense. However, to allow the firm to deduct that 
expense from its income for the year in full would be too generous. The firm still possesses the 
asset, which will continue to have value until the end of its working-life. Thus, most tax 
authorities will not allow the firm to deduct the full cost of the asset as an expense immediately. 
Instead, the firm must deduct the expense on a periodic basis, generally mirroring the gradual 
decrease in value of the asset until it becomes worthless.54 
The United States (Depreciation) 
In the United States, depreciation follows the specifications of the Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (“MACRS”), which contains comprehensive schedules of the rates at which 
specified assets or classes of assets may be depreciated at.55 While there are multiple methods 
for calculating the rates of depreciation under MACRS, the most common method is the 
“declining balance method”,56 which allows for faster depreciation when the asset is initially 
purchased, with the rate of depreciation relative to the cost price of the asset declining over 
time.57 
The United Kingdom (Capital Allowances) 
The United Kingdom concept of capital allowances has a major conceptual difference from 
that of depreciation, the adoption of which it has continuously rejected.58 Strictly speaking, the 
English tax system draws a distinction between revenue expenditure and capital expenditure. 
While revenue expenditure may be deductible in computing the profits of a trade, capital 
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expenditure is not. It has been suggested that the reason why the English tax system did not 
initially have a system for recognizing capital expenditure is because income tax was thought 
to be only temporary.59 An outright refusal to recognize the gradual depreciation in the value 
of capital assets renders the calculation of the true amount of profits earned from trade 
inaccurate. Expenditures of capital assets are a cost of doing business in much the same way 
as revenue expenditures are.60 
Another effect of disallowing the deduction of capital expenditure is that it has a 
distortionary effect on the market, disadvantaging capital-intensive businesses. Yet there is no 
good reason why capital-intensive businesses should suffer as such. The great importance of 
such capital-intensive businesses eventually led to the implementation of various schemes to 
recognize the true costs of capital expenditure.61 The most extensive and established scheme is 
the capital allowance system,62 which broadly functions in a similar manner to the MACRS in 
the United States.  
 
A Schedular System  
Both MACRS and the capital allowance system are highly prescriptive, relying heavily on 
comprehensive schedules of assets which provide for differing tax treatment of the various 
assets or classes of assets. This is done to keep the system reasonably simple,63 for it would be 
a nearly impossible task to attempt to estimate the exact depreciation in value of each and every 
asset being claimed by taxpayers. The schedular system has provided particular advantages in 
terms of flexibility of economic policy. Where the Government wished to introduce a particular 
adjustment to the rate of depreciation, instead of changing the general taxing provision or 
specially enacting a separate section, it was able to simply change the rate for a particular asset 
or class of assets in the schedule. In this way, a very flexible system could be created where 
the Government could provide incentives for very specific classes of capital assets depending 
on what economic policy required. 
 
Two Dimensions of Adjustments 
While the primary function of MACRS is to reflect the true costs of doing business, it has been 
used on multiple occasions to provide firms with an incentive to engage in certain activities. 
The prescriptive nature of the system, with its extensive schedules make it possible to single 
out particular activities for special tax treatment. There are two main dimensions by which the 
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standard declining balance method may be adjusted to produce intended distortionary effects: 
1) accelerated depreciation, and 2) bonus depreciation.  
Accelerated Depreciation 
“Accelerated depreciation is the allowance of deductions for declines in the value of an asset 
at higher rates than are expected to occur in practice.” Conceptually, the total amount of tax 
deductions attributable to the capital expenditure does not change. Instead, the deductions are 
brought forward so that they can be made earlier.64 In effect, the taxpayer receives an interest-
free loan from the Government, equivalent to the amount of tax deferred as a result of the early 
deduction.65 Apart from the interest-free loan from the Government, accelerated depreciation 
also offers firms several other benefits. First, as the value of money decreases over time due to 
inflation, the ability to defer one’s taxes raises the net present value of the capital asset,66 since 
the deduction is claimed in present dollars rather than in future dollars (which are worth less).67  
Second, while future tax deductions are uncertain since they may be affected by a 
variety of unexpected factors, claiming the deductions immediately locks in the effect of the 
tax deductions, reducing the risk for the business.68  Third, the early deduction of capital 
expenditure provides cash flow benefits, giving the firm more liquid cash and allowing the 
asset to breakeven at a faster rate.69 Finally, accelerated depreciation provide an important 
source of funds to firms and reduces the need to obtain external financing.70 Presently both the 
US MACRS and the UK capital allowances system have default depreciation rates that are 
accelerated.71 Nevertheless, the depreciation rates are frequently further accelerated to achieve 
economic objectives, particularly to stimulate capital investment during times of recession.72 
Bonus Depreciation 
For prescribed categories of capital expenditure, the taxpayer is allowed to deduct more than 
100% of the cost of the capital asset. Bonus depreciation is used considerably less frequently 
than accelerated depreciation as a policy, although Congress did provide for it in the Job 
Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, in the wake of the September 11 attacks.73 Bonus 
depreciation is often combined with accelerated depreciation, though it can be effective as a 
standalone policy.  
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Assessing the Two Dimensions 
Assessing Accelerated Depreciation 
If accelerated depreciation can give taxpayers considerable benefits, it follows that there must 
be a cost to the Government. These costs largely mirror the benefits that the taxpayer receives. 
The most obvious cost is the “'interest' on this 'loan' less any revenue from taxation of the extra 
income earned by the taxpayer as a result of the 'loan'”,74 after factoring in the decrease in the 
value of money due to inflation. The Government also bears a “certainty risk”, since there is 
no guarantee that the firm will still be in business with it is time to collect the deferred taxes. 
However, the sheer number of taxpayers in a jurisdiction creates very efficient spreading of the 
risk, putting the Government in the strongest position to bear such a risk. Unless a Government 
has a persistent and major fiscal deficit, the benefits to the taxpayer in terms of cash flow and 
availability of funds are not a significant cost to the Government. 
It is noted that accelerated depreciation means that in the early years where capital 
assets are purchased, the Government will suffer revenue losses, which will be recovered in 
later years. This effect can be very large indeed if the expenditure on capital assets as a society 
constantly increases, as would be expected in a growing economy.75 This may result in a budget 
deficit if the Government does not estimate the effect of accelerated depreciation accurately.  
Assessing Bonus Depreciation 
By allowing a deduction greater than the cost of a capital asset, the Government is basically 
collecting less tax revenue than it otherwise would have. An interesting observation from 
empirical research is that bonus depreciation can have a very powerful effect on investment in 
long-lived capital assets. House and Shapiro’s findings indicate that the investment supply 
elasticities of long-lived capital assets are very high, making bonus depreciation policies very 
effective. Their study also found no evidence of an increase in market prices as a response to 
bonus depreciation.76 This suggests that bonus depreciation is a very powerful policy tool, 
provided that the Government is willing to bear the potentially significant costs of allowing for 
bonus deductions. 
General Comments 
Adjustments to MACRS basically directly affect only those businesses that are capital -
intensive. 77  As such, this distortionary effect must be understood and factored in when 
formulating tax policy. Studies suggest that capital investment is more volatile than spending 
by consumers or governments,78 making adjustments to MACRS potentially very effective.  
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Automation Regulation and Depreciation 
Automation technology is progressing at a rapid rate and manifesting in so many different 
forms that it would be a considerable challenge for regulators to attempt to use a general tax 
provision to encompass all the relevant cases. Further, the management of the rate at which 
automation displaces human workers is a very delicate matter. The impact of automation in 
different industries varies considerably and there are good reasons for tailoring the tax 
treatment of the various assets according to their impact on human workers. As such, the 
flexibility offered by the MACRS schedular system is particularly suitable in the automation 
regulation context. Further, the MACRS requires that an asset must be used in a trade in order 
for its cost to be deducted against trade income. This ensures that it is only the displacement of 
human workers that is addressed; non-commercial uses of the assets, for example by consumers, 
would not be caught by the system. This avoids the creation of distortions beyond what is 
specifically targeted.  
  
Two Dimensions of Adjustment (Automation Regulation) 
Our proposed system of automation regulation would involve adjustments to the MACRS 
along the two dimensions considered above. As the function of automation regulation is to 
disincentivize specific uses of capital assets, the policy tools available to the Government 
would be 1) decelerated depreciation, and 2) reverse depreciation (appreciation).  
Decelerated Depreciation 
This model simply involves a reversal of the declining balance method. Rather than allowing 
faster depreciation at the time of acquisition of the capital asset, which slows towards the end 
of the working-life of the asset, a suitable disincentive would be provided by reversing the 
process and making the depreciation rate start out slowly. A stronger version of this proposal 
would involve lengthening the overall period over which depreciation takes place. For example, 
if a capital asset has a working life of 10 years, decelerated depreciation might require a firm 
to depreciate the asset over 20 years, even after the asset has ceased to exist, or is sold.  
The incentives considered above under accelerated depreciation would simply be 
reversed under our proposal and become disincentives. The taxpayer is forced to make an 
interest-free loan to the Government, putting some strain on cash flows and potentially 
requiring the firm to have recourse to external capital. The certainty risk of being able to set 
off the pre-paid taxes against future taxes would rest on the taxpayer, who may no longer be in 
business by the time they are allowed to do so. With all of these disincentives (which can be 
calibrated through the rate of depreciation), the Government has a powerful economic tool 
which it can use to slow down the displacement of human workers by automation.  
 
  
Reverse Depreciation (Appreciation) 
Conceptually, there are five different positions which the Government can take when it comes 
to the deductible value of an asset. It can allow deductions of 1) more than 100% of the value 
(bonus depreciation); 2) exactly 100% of the value (neutral depreciation); 3) less than 100% of 
the value (reduced depreciation); 4) 0% of the value (no depreciation); or 5) less than 0% of 
the value (reverse (or negative) depreciation). “No depreciation” is an interesting case, because 
it treats the acquisition of a capital asset as a non-event for the purposes of income tax. The 
taxpayer’s income is unaffected by the capital expense. Reverse depreciation is simply the 
inverse of bonus depreciation. Instead of being allowed to deduct more than 100% of the cost 
of a qualifying capital asset, a firm acquiring a specified capital asset under the reverse 
depreciation regime will have a certain percentage of its cost treated as income. This adjustment 
is similar in effect to the tax recognition of a notional appreciation of the value of a capital 
asset. Reverse depreciation can be used as a standalone policy or together with decelerated 
depreciation.  
 
Assessing the Two Dimensions (Automation Regulation) 
The costs to the Government under accelerated depreciation (discussed above) become 
potential sources of revenue under decelerated depreciation. In the case of reverse depreciation, 
by disallowing certain portions of the cost of capital assets, the Government basically deems 
the profit of a firm to be higher than its true profit. The additional tax revenue collected from 
this exercise can then similarly be hypothecated and used to correct the social externalities 
created by automation.  
 
Distinguishing Employment-Complementing from Employment-Substituting Capital 
Having established that the two goals of our proposed tax reform are best accomplished by 
making adjustments to the system of capital allowances, we will now suggest two approaches 
for distinguishing between employment-complementing capital, expenditure on which will 
enjoy higher rates of tax deductibility, and employment-substituting capital, expenditure on 
which will be relatively less tax-deductible.  
Both approaches are similar in that they assess the causal effect of capital on 
employment in order to determine the rate at which expenditure on this capital should be tax-
deductible. The difference between both approaches lies in how the causal effect of the capital 
investment on employment is determined. The first approach assesses the collective effect of 
the firm’s capital investments as a whole, while the second approach targets individual 
instances of capital investment. Another difference is that the first approach takes a backward-
looking and empirical approach to measuring the effect of the firm’s capital investment 
decisions on employment, while the latter approach forecasts the likely effects of individual 
instances of capital investment based on the features of the asset purchased.  
  
The first proposed tax reform ties the overall deductibility of capital investment to the 
company’s overall record of employing workers. Under this proposal, the percentage of the 
annual depreciation cost of the capital investment that is deductible as part of the company’s 
capital allowance will vary each year depending on the total net percentage change in 
employment in that year. Companies that reduce employment levels in a given year will only 
be allowed to deduct part of the full annual depreciation cost of their investment from their 
payable income in that year, while companies that increase overall employment levels will 
instead be granted a bonus deduction of more than 100% of the annual depreciation cost of that 
investment. This reform has several features and implications.  
It considers the company’s use of capital and assets holistically. Instead of assessing 
each piece of capital in isolation to determine its effect on employment, it treats all the capital 
of the company as an entire system along with the company’s processes and operations. This 
accounts for the possibility that the effect of a piece of capital on employment is determined 
not only by its nature and type but also by the way it is deployed within the company as well 
as its interactions with other capital investments.  
By adopting a backward-looking and empirical approach of observing employment data, 
this approach offers greater accuracy in determining the magnitude of the change in 
employment that follows from a company’s investment policies, at the cost of reducing 
certainty about the cause of this change in employment. The advantage of this approach is that 
it creates a strong incentive for companies to raise or maintain employment by directly 
targeting the intended outcome – ensuring that employment levels are maintained in the face 
of increasing automation. The disadvantage is that it is difficult to determine whether observed 
changes in employment levels should be attributed to the capital investments made by the 
company, blunting the incentive for the company to invest in employment-complementing 
capital.  
It provides the greatest incentives to raise employment for capital-intensive companies. 
As these companies have higher levels of capital expenditure, they stand to gain more from 
capital allowances should they invest in employment-complementing capital. This contributes 
to improving the overall productivity of the economy by providing greater incentives for job 
creation in high-productivity companies.  
It provides companies with distinct direct and indirect incentives to maintain or increase 
net levels of employment. The direct incentive arises because companies that reduce their net 
employment levels suffer an immediate reduction in the tax-deductibility of their capital 
expenditure. The indirect incentive arises because companies that face a choice between an 
employment-complementing capital asset and an employment-substituting capital asset will, 
all things equal, expect a future tax benefit from choosing the former over the latter.  
Companies that have made capital investments in the past will face the same incentives 
to maintain or raise overall employment levels as companies that are planning to make capital 
investments, because the deductibility of both past and future capital expenditure depends 
solely on changes in present employment levels.  
  
By tying the deductibility of capital expenditure to net employment instead of gross 
jobs displaced, this proposal creates an incentive to hire workers that is symmetrical to the 
disincentive to retrench workers. The upshot is that labour market rigidities are minimized 
because firms are not penalized for retrenching workers if they do not have significant profits 
against which capital expenditure can be deducted or if they balance these retrenchments with 
the hiring of new workers.  
The second possible approach is to remove or reduce the deductibility of capital 
expenditure on a specified group of items, regardless of whether capital expenditure on these 
assets coincides with any changes in overall firm employment levels. These specified group of 
items are those capital assets that are deemed as significant contributors to the problem of 
automation-induced job displacement, based on the conjunction of several criteria: 1) their 
propensity to be deployed in ways that displace existing jobs, 2) their potential for widespread 
adoption and by extension for widespread job displacement, and 3) their low likelihood of 
contributing to the creation of new job opportunities.  
This approach relies on the classification of capital assets into categories based on their 
propensity to substitute or complement employment, as well as the subsequent promulgation 
of this classification as schedules detailing the deductibility rates of capital expenditure on 
different assets. The use of schedules here as an administrative mechanism is well-established. 
Indeed, schedules that specify the depreciation are used in the administration of the existing 
capital allowance system. Modifying and expanding these schedules to also specify different 
rates of deductibility for different capital assets is a natural extension of the existing capital 
allowance system. A panel of independent experts can be convened to draft the schedules and 
perform the categorization of assets.  
This approach avoids labour market rigidities because the deductibility of capital 
expenditure is tied to the nature of the asset, instead of the firm’s decisions on employment. 
Hence, the firm is not subject to any new restrictions or policies on hiring or firing workers, 
preserving labour market flexibility.  
 
Leakage 
Our proposal of reducing the deductibility of capital expenditure for some classes of capital 
assets faces the major challenge of avoiding leakage through outsourcing and offshoring. 
Companies can respond to our proposal by offshoring or outsourcing production that 
intensively uses employment-substituting capital to foreign contractors or suppliers that are not 
affected by our proposed changes to the tax regime.79  
The EU faced a similar issue, termed “carbon leakage”, in its implementation and 
enforcement of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (“ETS”), a cap-and-trade policy on 
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greenhouse gas emissions.80 While the ETS was introduced to encourage companies to reduce 
emissions, there was concern that companies would respond by outsourcing emissions-
intensive production to countries with less stringent environmental laws in order to ensure that 
their own emissions remained within their allowances.81 The extent to which carbon leakage 
has actually blunted the impact of EU emissions policy is unclear.82  
The upshot is that the possibility of “automation leakage” should be seriously 
considered by policymakers when designing and implementing changes to the existing system 
of capital allowances. Notwithstanding this, the extent of any automation leakage is likely to 
be less than that of carbon leakage. The suppliers and contractors in the case of carbon leakage 
are likely to be based in less-developed economies with a weaker incentive to implement 
stringent environmental regulations. In the case of automation leakage, however, the 
infrastructure, technological ecosystems, and highly-specialized labour required for 
automation-intensive production are likely to be found in highly-developed economies – the 
very economies with the strongest incentive to discourage excessive automation for fear of 
displacing domestic employment. This reduces the potential severity of the issue and creates 
the possibility of cooperation between developed economies to jointly tackle the related 
problems of automation-induced job displacement and automation leakage.  
In the event that the issue of automation leakage materializes, it is likely to be 
concentrated in a limited number of sectors. The reason for this is that the relocation of 
production to avoid the incentives against using employment-substituting capital is only viable 
under the following limited conditions: first, the returns from employment-substituting capital 
in that sector must be significantly greater than the returns from employment-complementing 
alternatives; second, the sector, or at least crucial links in the supply chain, must be tradable; 
finally, it must be economically viable in that sector to relocate supply chains to an economy 
without similar policies to discourage employment-substituting capital.  
 
Conclusion 
In light of the research by House and Shapiro indicating that the investment supply elasticities 
of long-lived capital assets are very high,83 the adjustments we have proposed would seem to 
have considerable potential to affect taxpayer behaviour. When we consider that most forms of 
automation are highly capital-intensive and that adjustments to the MACRS generally only 
affect businesses which are capital-intensive,84 the proposed adjustments seem reasonably fit 
for purpose. These effects, when combined with the revenue generation function of the 
adjustments, make them a very viable proposal for the “automation tax”. In fact, the schedular 
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nature of the MACRS and capital allowances system provide the Government with much 
needed flexibility to successfully regulate the rapidly developing field of automation. We 
therefore conclude that the MACRS is likely to be the most appropriate candidate for the 
proposed “automation tax”. 
 
G. Conclusion 
This article has argued that by using reverse depreciation/ capital allowances, governments and 
tax authorities are able to make use of an existing and well-established system that is uniquely 
well-suited to deal with the problems of lack of precision and slowness of response to change. 
An automation tax could practically be implemented using reverse depreciation/ capital 
allowances as a mechanism. As a useful tool for governments to have on hand, an automation 
tax can be quickly implemented by building on the existing depreciation/ capital allowances 
framework where necessary. It can be used to manage the balance between the positive and 
negative externalities of automation and artificial intelligence by calibrating the level of their 
adoption through the use of these tax incentives. As the benefits from the efficiency savings 
from automation and artificial intelligence continue to be attractive to the majority of states, 
we do not anticipate that the robot tax will be adopted widely. However, it remains a useful 
policy tool in those select situations where social considerations may need to be prioritized. 
 
 
